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• It is now widely recognized that greater trans-
parencyfacilitatesthesmoothimplementation
of monetary policy and increases its effectiveness.
• The response of interest rates to the publication
of macroeconomic data depends on the
degree of transparency in the conduct of
monetary policy. In an efficient market,
interest rates could rise or fall following the
publication of macroeconomic data as a
reflection of the market’s revised expectations
of monetary policy.
• To the extent that market participants are able
to anticipate monetary policy decisions,
announcements of changes to the target
overnight rate should not normally cause
pronounced fluctuations in the short-term
interest rate.
• Since the implementation of ﬁxed announce-
ment dates for the target overnight interest
rate, the response of interest rates to the
publication of macroeconomic data and to
changes to the target overnight rate are an
indication of how well ﬁnancial markets now
understand the factors taken into account by
the Bank of Canada in its conduct of monetary
policy.
ince the early1990s, the Bank of Canada has
taken various steps to increase the transparency
of its monetary policy in order to help financial
markets to identify the information on which
the Bank bases its monetary policy decisions. Trans-
parency should thus cause ﬁnancial markets to adjust
their interest rate expectations as soon as macroeco-
nomic data are published, in advance of any action by
the central bank. This article1 examines this aspect of
transparency in monetary policy by examining the
response of interest rates to the periodic publication of
macroeconomic indicators.
Deﬁnition, Beneﬁts, and Practice of
Transparency
We define transparency as the outcome of all measures
taken by the central bank to allow ﬁnancial markets
and economic agents in general to acquire a thorough
knowledge and understanding of the factors taken
into account in the formulation of monetary policy.2
It is widely recognized today that transparency in
monetary policy yields many benefits. First, by
announcing its inﬂation targets, the central bank helps
economic agents to form their expectations of future
inﬂation. Thus, the formation of inﬂation expectations
when credible targets exist will attenuate rather than
exacerbatetheeffectofunanticipatedshocksoninflation.
Second, transparency allows ﬁnancial markets to bet-
ter anticipate the measures that the central bank will
implement, and to account for them in their operations.
1.  This article is an extension of the work of Gravelle and Moessner (2002),
which contains a detailed description of the assumptions used here. How-
ever, as is explained in note 9, the econometric methodology used in this arti-
cle is slightly different.
2.  The information and analysis for monetary policy decisions are described
in Macklem (2002).
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Thus, the central bank can change its target for the
overnight rate without provoking too much market
volatility.
During the 1990s, the Bank of Canada implemented
several initiatives that were intended, among other
things, to make monetary policy more transparent.3
These measures included the establishment in 1991 of
the inﬂation-control targets, the semi-annual publica-
tion, as of 1995, of the Monetary Policy Report and,
beginning in 1996, the issuing of press releases
explaining monetary policy decisions. More recently,
in December 2000, the Bank of Canada instituted a
schedule of ﬁxed dates for announcing changes to the
target overnight rate.
Market Efﬁciency and the Impact of
Transparency
To determine the degree of monetary stimulus
required to achieve the inﬂation target midpoint of
two per cent, the Bank of Canada monitors many mac-
roeconomic indicators, including monthly release of
the GDP and CPI data. When ﬁnancial markets prop-
erly understand the factors that affect inﬂation, how
the Bank evaluates them, and the steps it will likely
take to deal with them, interest rates should instantly
adjust to the information provided by new macroeco-
nomic data. The theory of efﬁcient markets predicts
that the prices of ﬁnancial instruments will always
reﬂect all available information. If markets are efﬁ-
cient, interest rates should adjust virtually instantane-
ously after the release of data that modify ﬁnancial
markets’expectations concerning monetary policy.
Clearly, it is impossible to perfectly
predict the decisions of the central
bank, since they are not simple
mechanical reactions but are taken in
the context of economic uncertainty.
In a context of perfect transparency and symmetric
information, changes to the overnight rate announced
by the Bank of Canada would thus be completely
anticipated by the markets, and consequently would
3.  See Thiessen (2000).
not result in any changes to the yield curve. The oppo-
site would be true if monetary policy were poorly under-
stood or if markets did not share the Bank’s evaluation
of the state of the economy. Clearly, it is impossible to
perfectly predict the decisions of the central bank, since
they are not simple mechanical reactions but are taken
in the context of economic uncertainty.4 For that reason,
judgment remains critical to the decision-making
process. Nevertheless, even if the conduct of mone-
tary policy continues to be characterized by some
uncertainty, increased transparency should yield a
closer correlation between how the Bank and markets
interpret economic developments.
Before December 2000, uncertainty associated with
monetary policy sprang partly from the fact that mar-
kets did not know precisely when the Bank would
change the overnight rate. Understanding the role of
Canadianmacroeconomicdatainthedecision-making
process shed little light on this issue, so market partic-
ipants put limited effort into understanding the possi-
ble impact this data might have on monetary policy. In
addition, since participants always had to position
themselves in markets with an eye to a possible
change in the overnight rate, trading slowed to a
snail’s pace on mornings when the announcement of a
change to the overnight rate was expected. This uncer-
tainty sometimes lasted for several consecutive days.
The new system was meant to allow ﬁnancial markets
to better anticipate changes to the interest rate and to
encourage them to pay closer attention to the economic
and monetary environment in Canada.5 One of our
speciﬁc purposes here is to determine whether these
goals have been met.
Modelling Factors That Affect
Interest Rates
For the purposes of our analysis, we used a model that
allowed us to measure the impact that the “surprise”
component of published macroeconomic data and
changes to the overnight rate have on short-term
rates. This model is based on simple linear regressions
and is written as follows:
4.  See Jenkins and Longworth (2002).
5.  See Dodge (2002).
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where the dependent variable,  represents the
daily change in the interest rate for a given term,6 is
a constant,  reﬂects the value of macroeconomic
indicator published on day is the number of mac-
roeconomic indicators,  captures market expecta-
tions for this indicator,7  is the change in the target
for the overnight rate, and is the lagged value of
the dependent variable.
Financial markets’ expectations are given by the
median of the responses from Standard & Poor’s MMS
survey conducted before each release of data. On days
when no announcements are made, is equal
to zero. The coefﬁcients of each regression are esti-
mated using ordinary least squares.8 Including the
change in the overnight rate allowed us to verify
whether changes to this rate were anticipated by the
markets. The closing rates on futures contracts for
three-month bankers’ acceptances (BAX contracts), as
well as yields on two-year benchmark bonds issued
by the Government of Canada, were our dependent
variables. We used BAX futures rather than another
money market instrument because they tend to react
more rapidly than other ﬁnancial instruments to mac-
roeconomic announcements. Harvey (1996) explains
that, “The higher degree of ﬂexibility provided by the
BAX market may encourage participants to deal in the
BAX market before dealing in the spot market when
new information is available.”
We used both Canadian and U.S. economic indicators
in our study. Since Canada is an open economy closely
linked to the economy of the United States, we
expected the U.S. data to affect the Canadian yield
curve. We therefore used 10 explanatory variables
from the U.S. economy in addition to Canadian macro-
economic data. The Canadian indicators are the con-
sumer price index (CPI); the CPI excluding food,
6.  Ideally, one would measure interest rate variations occurring within min-
utes of the publication of data. Indeed, Ederington and Lee (1993) and Flem-
ing and Remolona (1999) show that price reactions to an anticipated
publication of economic data are exhausted after one or two minutes. In many
empirical studies, however, the researcher does not have access to high-fre-
quency data—for example, minute-by-minute observations. Consequently,
the interest rate variations we used in this study reﬂect changes in the closing
rate observed between two consecutive working days.
7. According to the theory of efﬁcient ﬁnancial markets, interest rates should
react exclusively to the unanticipated element of announcements. If announce-
ments perfectly reﬂect the participants’ expectations, then interest rates do
not react to this information.
8. A covariance matrix adjusted by the Newey-West method yields unbiased
estimates in the case of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the residu-
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energy, and the effects of changes in indirect taxes; the
producer price index; wage settlements; employment;
the unemployment rate; retail sales; the merchandise
trade balance; GDP; and the current account. The U.S.
macroeconomic indicators are non-farm payrolls, the
unemployment rate, the CPI, the producer price index,
housing starts, retail sales, the index produced by the
National Association of Purchasing Management
(NAPM, recently renamed ISM), industrial production,
trade in goods and services, and the GDP.
Empirical Evidence
To evaluate the Bank’s success in achieving greater
transparency, we estimated the model for two periods.
The ﬁrst ran from February 1996, when the Bank
began to issue press releases explaining the reasons
underlying each monetary policy decision, until
November 2000, i.e., immediately before the establish-
ment of the system of ﬁxed announcement dates. The
second period began in December 2000 and ended in
September 2002. We used this second period to deter-
mine whether the new system appears to have
focused the attention of market participants more on
the Canadian economy. Clearly, care must be taken in
evaluating the results of this process, since the second
sample is very short.
One striking result from the analysis of the ﬁrst period
is the signiﬁcant impact that changes to the overnight
rate had on interest rates (see Table 1). This result is
consistent with our expectations, since the higher lev-
els of uncertainty that existed before the implementa-
tion of the ﬁxed announcement dates made predicting
monetary policy much harder. The opposite result
Coefficient of the variation in the
overnight rate (from February 1996
to November 2000)
(p-value)
Coefficient of the variation in the












Note: When the p-value is less than 0.01, the coefﬁcient of the variable is
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was evident when the same estimation was per-
formed on data from the period following the estab-
lishment of the new system, suggesting that the
system of ﬁxed announcement dates improved mar-
ket participants’ ability to predict monetary policy
measures.
With regard to the importance
assigned to macroeconomic data,
results from the ﬁrst period indicate
that Canadian interest rates did not
measurably react to the publication
of Canadian data.
With regard to the importance assigned to macroeco-
nomic data, results from the ﬁrst period indicate that
Canadian interest rates did not measurably react to
the publication of Canadian data. Aside from
employment data, which signiﬁcantly affected the
two-year rate at the 5 per cent level, no release of
Canadian macroeconomic data affected interest rates
before the implementation of ﬁxed announcement
dates.9 Moreover, our results reveal that, taken
together, the Canadian data did not have a signiﬁcant
impact on interest rates (see Table 2). During the
period preceding the adoption of the ﬁxed announce-
ment dates, U.S. indicators signiﬁcantly explained the
changes in Canadian interest rates. In fact, several
coefﬁcients of U.S. indicators are signiﬁcant and have
the expected sign. Four U.S. indicators had an impact
onboththetwo-yearinterestratesandtheBAXfutures:
industrial production, the ISM index, non-farm pay-
rolls, and retail sales. Comments from market partici-
pants and analysts conﬁrm that these four variables
are indeed likely to affect markets.10
Given the size of the U.S. market and the level of
openness of the Canadian economy, we would expect
Canadian interest rates to be affected by the economic
9.  At the 1 per cent level, no coefﬁcient associated with Canadian announce-
ments is signiﬁcantly different than zero. Gravelle and Moessner (2002)
obtain the same result. Their model is similar, except that they do not include
lagged values for the dependent variable.
10. U.S. GDP also counts among the variables with a signiﬁcant impact on the
BAX, but it does not have the expected positive sign.
developments observed in the United States. However,
Canadian data should also have an impact on short-
term interest rates, since the Bank’s monetary policy is
clearly targeting, ﬁrst and foremost, the Canadian
economy. The fact that, taken together, Canadian data
were not signiﬁcant prior to the implementation of the
new system raises important questions.
According to Gravelle and Moessner (2002), the
results showing that Canadian interest rates princi-
pally reacted to American data before the adoption of
the ﬁxed announcement dates can be explained by the
considerable convergence in the business cycles of the
two countries, which gives rise to substantial correla-
tion in their monetary policies. During the ﬁrst of the
sample periods, one-quarter of the decisions taken by
the Bank of Canada to raise or lower the overnight
rate were made the day following a meeting of the
FOMC (Open Market Committee of the Federal
Reserve). Moreover, these changes were in the same
direction, and of the same magnitude, as those of the
Federal Reserve. Given the impossibility of predicting
exactly when the overnight rate would be changed by
referring only to data published in Canada, Canadian
ﬁnancial markets focused on developments within the
U.S. business cycle. Comments gathered from Cana-
dian market participants further conﬁrm that they
believed that the U.S. business cycle was a good indi-
cator of Canadian monetary policy.
The results obtained from the period following the
adoption of the ﬁxed announcement dates reveal a
radical change. First, it appears that Canadian macro-
economic data now play a greater role in short-term
interest rate ﬂuctuations in Canada. In particular,
retail sales and the unemployment rate affect both the
two-year rates and the BAX rate. Moreover, the pro-
ducer price index and the GDP also affect BAX futures,
and all the coefﬁcients associated with these variables
p-value associated with a Wald test
(sample February 1996 to
November 2000)
p-value associated with a Wald test
(sample December 2000 to
September 2002)
Table 2





Note: When the p-value is less than 0.01, the assumption that Canadian data have no
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have the expected sign.11 In addition, the number of
U.S. indicators having a signiﬁcant impact on the
interest rate has declined, though some U.S. data
retain their importance. This result conﬁrms the
assumption that market participants assigned far too
much weight to announcements made in the United
States when Canadian data did not allow for precise
forecasts of the timing of interest rate changes in
Canada.12 Note that U.S. data, taken together, remain
signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level after the establish-
ment of the new system.
This result conﬁrms the assumption
that market participants assigned far
too much weight to announcements
made in the United States when
Canadian data did not allow for
precise forecasts of the timing of
interest rate changes in Canada.
We have already established that, since the institution
of the ﬁxed announcement dates, changes to the over-
night rate have not had a signiﬁcant impact on the
short-term interest rates, since ﬁnancial markets are
generally able to anticipate these changes. However,
we know that on some occasions under the new sys-
tem the Bank did surprise ﬁnancial markets. To meas-
ure the impact of these surprises, we replaced the
variable for changes to the target overnight rate in the
preceding model with the unexpected portion of the
changes.13 Our results indicate that these surprises
11. The coefﬁcient of the current account is also signiﬁcant when the two-year
interest rate is the dependent variable, but it does not have the expected posi-
tive sign. When the current account is excluded from our equation, the Cana-
dian data, taken together, remain signiﬁcant, and our results are unaltered.
12.  In order to test different speciﬁcations, we re-estimated all the equations
omitting the lagged dependent variables, as in Gravelle and Moessner (2002).
Overall, our results were unaffected.
13. To measure surprises, we needed to determine the markets’ expectations,
which we did with a model based on money market instruments and our esti-
mate of a term premium. For the entire period following the adoption of the
ﬁxed announcement dates, the mean surprise associated with changes to the
Bank’s target rates was a little less than 10 basis points. On 3 of a total of 15
announcement dates, the Bank strongly surprised markets, the announced
decision being at least 25 basis points greater or less than what was expected
by the markets.
did not have the same impact on the BAX rate as on
the rate for the two-year benchmark bonds (see Table
3). In fact, they seem to have had a signiﬁcant effect on
the BAX futures, while having none at all on the two-
year rates. This may be explained by the fact that BAX
contracts are shorter-term instruments and more
likely to react to a surprise because their rates are
tightly linked to the overnight rate. On the other hand,
two-year interest rates more closely reﬂect the overall
direction of monetary policy. That these rates do not
signiﬁcantly react to a surprise occurring on a prede-
termined date suggests that ﬁnancial markets did not
adjust their expectations regarding the direction of
monetary policy in the medium term. Financial markets
are thus able to accurately anticipate general trends in
interest rates, even if they are sometimes surprised on
a given date by a speciﬁc announcement.
Financial markets are thus able to
accurately anticipate general trends
in interest rates, even if they are
sometimes surprised on a given date
by a speciﬁc announcement.
While there is some indication that market partici-
pants now pay more attention to the economic and
monetary environment in Canada, it is difﬁcult to
determine whether this change is exclusively attribut-
able to the system of ﬁxed announcement dates or
whether other factors also play a role. We may, in par-
ticular, be inclined to believe that, if a shock affected
the Canadian and U.S. economies differently—for
example, the recent bursting of the speculative bubble
Coefficient associated with the surprise
(p-value)
Table 3
The Response of Interest Rates to Surprise Changes
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in the hi-tech sector—the monetary authorities of the
two countries would need to take different steps.
According to market participants, it would thus
become necessary to attribute greater importance to
developments in the Canadian economy. In any event,
considering that the system of ﬁxed announcement
dates has only been in place for a relatively short time,
the estimations of these models should be repeated in
the future to determine whether they bear out the cur-
rent conclusions.
Conclusions
Our research indicates that, ﬁrst, changes made to the
overnight rate before the establishment of the system
of ﬁxed announcement dates created some volatility
in interest rates; and, second, the publication of Cana-
dian macroeconomic data appears not to have had a
major impact on interest rates. Under the new system,
the impact of the publication of Canadian macroeco-
nomic data on short-term interest rates has increased.
This observation suggests that ﬁnancial markets now
have a greater understanding of the elements that con-
tribute to the conduct of monetary policy, and that the
Bank of Canada’s efforts to increase transparency
have yielded the desired results.
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